#### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RUSSEL MILTON WILLS,

Appellant,

No. 21378

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee.

### BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
Northern Division
Honorable William T. Beeks
District Judge

FILED

JUN 26 1967

WM. B. LUCK, CLERK

EUGENE G. CUSHING United States Attorney


MICHAEL J. SWOFFORD Assistant United States Attorney



	SUBJECT INDEX	
		Page
Table of Ca	ases and Other References	ii
Statement of Jurisdiction		1
Counterstatement of the Case		
Questions Presented		
Summary of	Argument	
Argument		
I & V	THE LOCAL BOARD'S ACTION DECLARING APPELLANT DELINQUENT WAS PROPER	8
II,III&IV	THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC LAW 89-152 IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE	14
VI & VII	APPELIANT WAS ADVISED OF RIGHTS TO PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND TO APPEAL BY THE NOTICE OF RECLASSIFICATION ISSUED OCTOBER 23, 1965; HE FAILED TO EXERCISE THESE RIGHTS AND THUS FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES	16
	A. Lateness In Sending Delinquency Notice Didn't Prejudice Appellant Because He Already Knew Reason For Reclassification	17
	Registrants Any Procedural Rights  C. Appellant Was Advised Of Right To Personal Appearance And To Appeal On October 23, 1965, But Did Not Exercise These Rights; Hence He Failed To Exhaust His Administrative Remedies	19
Conclusion		20
		22
Certificati	on	23



TABLE OF CASES AND OTHER REFERENCES			
1.	Cases:	Page:	
	Evans v. United States, 252 F.2d 509,511 (9th Cir. 1958)	21	
	Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 88L.Ed. 305 (1944)	21	
	Knox v. United States, 200 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1952)	19	
	O'Brien v. United States, F.2d , (1st Cir. April 10, 1967)	10,12,13,16	
	Shaw v. United States, 264 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1959)	19	
	United States v. Hertlein, 143 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Wis. 1956)	10	
	United States v. Kime, 188 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1951) cert.den. 342 U.S. 823	10	
	<u>United States</u> v. <u>Miller</u> , 367 F.2d 72,79 (2nd Cir. 1966)	10,15,16	
	United States v. Smith, 368 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1966)	15	
2.	Other References		
	Title 18, U.S.C., Section 3231	2	
	Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1291	2	
	Title 50 U.S.C.A., Section 462	15	
	Title 50 U.S.C.A., Section 462(b)(3)	13	
	Title 50 U.S.C.A., Section 462(b)	16	
	Title 50 U.S.C.A., Section 462(b)(6)	13	
	Public Iaw 89-152	5,6,13,14,15	
	Title 50 U.S.C.A., Section 462(b)(6)	13	



		Page:
32 C.F.R.	Section 1617.1	9,10,11
32 C.F.R.	Section 1632.14	15,20
32 C.F.R.	Section 1642	. 9
32 C.F.R.	Section 1642.3	. 18,19
32 C.F.R.	Section 1642.4	9,10
32 C.F.R.	Section 1642.4(a)	. 17
32 C.F.R.	Section 1642.4(b)	. 17
32 C.F.R.	Section 1642.12	. 11
	) of Federal Rules of Procedure	12



## STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION/1

Appellant, Russel Milton Wills, was charged in the following one-count Indictment with refusing to be inducted into the Armed Forces of the United States on or about February 24, 1966 (R1):

"The Grand Jury charges:

That on or about February 24, 1966, at Seattle, Washington within the Northern Division of the Western District of Washington, RUSSEL MILTON WILLS did knowingly, wilfully and unlawfully fail, neglect and refuse to perform a duty required of him by the Universal Military Training and Service Act, and the rules, regulations and directions made pursuant thereto, in that, having been duly and regularly ordered by a local Selective Service Board to report and submit to induction into the Armed Forces of the United States of America, he failed, neglected and refused to be inducted.

All in violation of Title 50 U.S.C., App. Section 462, and 32 C.F.R. 1632.14."

Appellant entered a plea of "not guilty" on August 5, 1966 (R2-R4), waived trial by jury (R6) and was tried by the Court on September 12, 1966 (TR). The Court took the case under advisement and announced a decision of "guilty" on September 23, 1966, in a Memorandum Decision (R14). Appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment on September 23, 1966,

<sup>1/</sup>In this brief, (R) will refer to the number of the records herein given by the Clerk of the Court for the Western District of Washington. (TR) will refer to the Court Reporter's transcript of proceedings. (EX) will refer to exhibits.



with the recommendation that he not be eligible for parole until such time as he had served two years of the sentence. A notice of appeal was also filed on September 23, 1966.

Jurisdiction of the District Court was based on Title 18, U.S.C., Section 3231. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1291.

## COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE


The exhibits admitted into evidence at the trial established that the appellant was ordered by Transfer Board No. 3, Seattle, Washington, on February 15, 1966, to report for induction on February 24, 1966. Appellant reported to the Induction Station in Seattle on February 24, 1966, but refused to be inducted into the Armed Forces. At that time he signed a witnessed statement as follows:

"I refuse to be inducted into the Armed Forces of the United States."

## /s/ Russel Milton Wills

The following summary of events leading up to appellant's refusal to be inducted is presented in chronological order for the Court's convenience:

October 15, 1965: Registrant sent a letter to his draft board, Local Board No. 47, Berkeley, California, in which he advised said board that he had intentionally destroyed his draft card and would henceforth refuse



to carry another. He further advised the Board that

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24



February 3, 1966: Registrant mailed a letter to Local Board No. 47, Berkeley, California, in which he acknowledged receipt of his order to report for induction. (EX 1, p.36-38)February 7, 1966: Registrant appeared at Transfer Board No. 3, Seattle, Washington, and requested to be transferred to that Board for the purpose of reporting for induction on a date to be set by Transfer Board No. 3, Seattle, Washington. His request was approved by Transfer Board No. 3 and he was in fact transferred from Local Board No. 47, Berkeley, California, to Transfer Board No. 3, Seattle, Washington, on February 10, 1966, for induction. (EX 1, p.55) February 15, 1966: Transfer Board No. 3, Seattle, Washington, mailed to registrant an Order For Transferred Man To Report For Induction, directing that he report for induction on February 24, 1966, at the Armed Forces Examining and Induction Station, Seattle, Washington. February 24, 1966: Registrant reported to the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station, Seattle, Washington, but refused to be inducted into the Armed Forces of the United States. At that time he signed a statement as follows: "I refuse to be inducted into the Armed Forces

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25


(EX 1, p.58 through 61).

of the United States -- signed Russel Milton Wills"



### QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- 1. Whether Local Board No. 47 properly declared appellant to be a delinquent:
  - (a) Whether a Local Board can declare a registrant delinquent for non-possession of his draft card.
  - (b) Whether the reason stated for appellant's delinquency (Destroyed his Registration Certificate) includes the offense of non-possession of a draft card.
  - (c) Whether appellant's constitutional rights to selfexpression and to petition his Government were
    infringed by the Local Board's action in declaring
    appellant delinquent.
- 2. Whether the constitutionality of Public Law 89-152 is an issue in this case, and, if so, whether said law is constitutional.
- 3. Whether appellant was denied procedural rights to a personal appearance before the Local Board and to an appeal:
  - (a) Whether the lateness of the Local Board in sending appellant a Delinquency Notice deprived him of any procedural rights.



- 2 3

- (b) Whether appellant already knew the reason for his reclassification.
- (c) Whether appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

## SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

- 1. The action taken by Local Board No. 47 in declaring appellant to be delinquent was in accordance with existing Selective Service regulations.
  - a. A Local Board can declare a registrant delinquent for non-possession of his draft card.
  - b. The reason stated for appellant's delinquency necessarily includes the offense of nonpossession of a draft card.
  - c. Appellant's constitutional rights to selfexpression and to petition his Government were
    not infringed by the Local Board's action of
    declaring appellant delinquent for non-possession of his draft card.
- 2. The constitutionality of Public Law 89-152 is not an issue in this case because the Indictment did not charge appellant for a violation of said statute. Public Law 89-152 is nevertheless constitutional.



8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

- Appellant was not denied any procedural rights to 3. a personal appearance before the Local Board or to an appeal.
  - The lateness of the Local Board in sending appellant a Delinquency Notice did not deprive him of any procedural rights because he already knew the reason for his reclassification and because a Delinquency Notice by itself does not entitle a registrant to a personal appearance or to an appeal.
  - Appellant was advised of his procedural rights b. to a personal appearance and to an appeal two days after he had been declared delinquent and reclassified I-A.



#### ARGUMENT

#### V & I

## THE LOCAL BOARD'S ACTION DECLARING APPELLANT DELINQUENT WAS PROPER

Both Points I and V of Appellant's Opening Brief relate to Local Board No. 47's action in declaring appellant a delinquent, and since both arguments involve related points of law, they will be treated together in this brief.

On October 15, 1965, appellant wrote the following letter to Local Board No. 47 in Berkeley, California:

Local Draft Board Bancroft Way Berkeley, Calif.

#### Gentlemen:

This is to inform your office that 1, I have intentionally destroyed by draft card and will henceforth refuse to carry another. 2, I have signed the C.N.V.A. petition, with which I am sure you are familiar. 3, I will refuse to co-operate with your office in any manner whatsoever. If you wish to take any measures against me, you can contact me at the following address...

Respectfully, /s/ Russel M. Wills Russel Milton Wills

On October 21, 1965, Local Board No. 47 declared appellant to be a delinquent and made the following entry on his Selective Service Cover Sheet: "Destroyed reg. card." Appellant contends that a Draft Board cannot make a registrant delinquent for a "strongly-worded letter" because such action would



penalize peaceful expression of unpopular views and would further abridge registrant's right to petition the Government.

Strongly-worded letter, standing by themselves, are not a basis for a delinquency declaration. However, when the letter has the registrant's signature affixed thereto and states that the registrant has intentionally destroyed his draft card, the letter is conclusive evidence that the registrant does not have his draft card in his possession.

32 C.F.R. 1642 sets forth the circumstances under which a registrant can be declared a delinquent. 32 C.F.R. Section 1642.4 states as follows:

(a) Whenever a registrant has failed to perform any duty or duties required of him under the Selective Service law other than the duty to comply with an order to report for induction, or the duty to comply with an order to report for civilian work..., the Local Board may declare him to be a delinquent.

One of the duties required under Selective Service law is for a registrant to have in his possession at all times a Selective Service Registration Certificate. This is spelled out in 32 C.F.R. Section 1617.1 which provides as follows:

Every person required to present himself for and submit to registration must, after he has registered, have in his personal possession at all times his Registration Certificate (SSS Form No. 2) prepared by his Local Board which has not been altered and on which no notation duly and validly inscribed thereon has been changed in any manner after its preparation by the Local Board...

The reasonableness and validity of this regulation has been



1. Certificate serves as proof of registration and contains complet information as to the registrant's classification;

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

- 2. In time of war or national emergency, it provides an instant means in a transient society of determining a registrant's fitness for immediate induction, if exigencies require it;
- 3. The Certificate can assist a Local Board to reconstruct files destroyed by fire or disaster;
- 4. The Certificate carries a continuing reminder to a registrant to notify his Board of facts which might change his classification; and
- 5. The Certificate facilitates personal inquiries to a Local Board.

Since Miller intentionally destroyed his draft card as indicated in the October 15, 1965, letter, it follows that he would not have the card in his possession and would thereby fail to fulfill the duty set forth in 32 C.F.R. Section 1617.1. Hence, the Local Board could properly declare him to be a delinquent for failure to perform a duty required of him, in accordance with 32 C.F.R. Section 1642.4. Once a registrant



has been declared delinquent, his Local Board may then reclassify him to Class I-A in accordance with 32 C.F.R. Section 1642.12 which reads in part as follows:

Any <u>delinquent</u> registrant between the ages of 18 years and 6 months and 26 years... may be classified in or reclassified into Class I-A or Class I-AO, whichever is applicable, regardless of other circumstances... (Emphasis supplied).

Hence, Local Board No. 47 had the authority to declare appellant delinquent and to reclassify him I-A and the Board followed the provision of the Selective Service regulations cited above when it took this action on October 21, 1965.

Appellant contends in Point V of his Opening Brief that no statute or regulation authorizes a Local Draft Board to declare a registrant delinquent for the reason that he "destroyed his Registration Certificate." It should be noted that a "Notice of Delinquency" by a Local Board does not make a man delinquent. He is delinquent because of an act he performs or fails to perform and not because of any determination by the Selective Service Board. Hence, Wills was delinquent at the moment he failed to have his Registration Certificate in his possession. The Notice of Delinquency prepared by a Local Board is fundamentally a part of the classification process and, in this case, the Notice of Delinquency document was merely an official recordation in appellant's file of a status into which he had already placed

, ,



himself the moment he failed to have his Registration Certificate in his possession.

The Notice of Delinquency states that the reason for the delinquency is that Wills "destroyed his Registration Certificate" (EX 1, p.29). These words and this reason necessarily <u>include</u> the fact that he did not have his Registration Certificate in his possession, because it would be impossible for a person to have in his possession something which he had recently destroyed. Therefore, the Board's authority for declaring Wills delinquent was the non-possession of this draft card (32 C.F.R. 1617.1). When preparing the Notice of Delinquency, the Board set forth therein reason for Wills not having the card in his possession ("destroyed his Registration Certificate") rather than the fact of non-possession. In brief, the words "destroyed his Registration Certificate" <u>include</u> the fact that he no longer possessed the Certificate.

Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged... (Emphasis supplied).

The case of O'Brien v. United States, F.2d (1st Cir. April 10, 1967) is directly in point. The defendant was charged in a one count Indictment for wilfully and knowingly mutilating, destroying and changing by burning his



registration certificate (SSS Form No. 2) in violation of
Title 50 U.S.C.A., Section 462(b)(3). The Indictment did not
contain a charge that the defendant failed to have his draft
card in his possession (a violation of 50 U.S.C.App.462(b)(6).
The Circuit Court held that Public Law 89-152 (50 U.S.C.A.
462(b)(3) which makes it a crime to knowingly destroy or
mutilate a draft card, was unconstitutional, but nevertheless
affirmed O'Brien's conviction on grounds that he failed to
have his draft card in his possession. Even though O'Brien
was not charge with non-possession of his draft card in the
Indictment, the Court reasoned that the offense of non-possession was included in the offense of wilfull destruction. The
Court stated:

In burning his Certificate he not only contravened subsection (b)(3), but also subsection (b)(6).

Subsection (b)(6) of 50 U.S.C.A. 462 is the provision which authorized prosecution for non-possession of a Certificate.

The Court in O'Brien, supra, also dealt with the same constitutional allegations set forth in appellant's brief herein and ruled that there is no constitutional objection to conviction for non-possession of the Certificate. As stated by the Court at page 5 of the Opinion:

Nor do we see any constitutional objection to conviction for non-possession of a Certificate. It is one thing to say that a requirement that has no reasonable basis may infringe upon free speech. Different considerations arise when



the statute has a proper purpose and the defendant merely invokes free speech as a reason for breaking it.


In summary, the law is clear that the offense of non-possession of a draft card is included within the offense of wilfull destruction of said card. The law is also clear that a registrant's constitutional rights are not infringed when he is convicted for non-possession of a draft card. Accordingly, appellant Wills was properly declared a delinquent by Local Board No. 47 on October 21, 1965, and his constitutional rights to free speech and to petition his Government were not infringed by said determination of delinquency.

#### II, III & IV

# THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC LAW 89-152 IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE

Appellant argues in Points II, III and TV of his
Opening Brief that Public Law 89-152, making it a crime to
knowingly destroy or mutilate a draft card, is unconstitutional because the statute abridges appellant's First
Amendment right to freedom of expression (Point II); because
it was intended and enacted for the purpose of suppressing
dissent (Point III); and because it does not serve any
rational legislative purpose and consequently deprives
appellant of personal liberty without due process of law
(Point IV).

.




The constitutionality of Public Iaw 89-152 relating to the burning or destruction of draft cards is not an issue in this case because the appellant has not been charged with violating said statute. Appellant has only been charged by Indictment with knowingly, wilfully and unlawfully refusing to be inducted into the Armed Forces of the United States on or about February 24, 1966, in violation of 50 U.S.C.App. Section 462 and 32 C.F.R. 1632.14. The above cited regulation provides as follows:

(a) When the Local Board mails to a registrant an Order to Report for Induction (SSS Form No. 252)..., it shall be the duty of the registrant to report for induction at the time and place fixed in such order...

Since appellant was not charged with nor found guilty of violation of Public Iaw 89-152, the constitutionality of said statute is not an issue before this Court. The draft card burning statute enters this case only indirectly in connection with the Notice of Delinquency, which issue was discussed supra. in Points I and V.

Nevertheless, the draft card burning statute (Public Law 89-152) has been tested before the Second and Eighth Circuits and the statute has been held constitutional in both United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2nd Cir. 1966) cert. den.\_\_\_\_\_, and in United States v. Smith, 368 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1966). The First and Fifth Amendment arguments



set forth in appellant's opening brief herein were fully discussed in the Miller case, supra, and to reiterate Judge Tyler's opinion in this brief would be repetitious. It should be noted, however, that the First Circuit in O'Brien v. United States, F.2d (1st Cir. 1967) created a split in the Circuits by recently holding the statute to be unconstitutional. However, the First Circuit affirmed O'Brien's conviction for violation of 50 U.S.C. Section 462(b) on grounds that he did not have his draft card in his possession after he had burned it.

## VI & VII

APPELLANT WAS ADVISED OF RIGHTS TO PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND TO APPEAL BY THE NOTICE OF RECLASSIFICATION ISSUED ON OCTOBER 23, 1965; HE FAILED TO EXERCISE THESE RIGHTS AND THUS FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Appellant's Selective Service file reveals that he was declared a delinquent and reclassified I-A on October 21, 1965. Two days later, Wills' Local Board sent him an SSS Form No. 110 by which he was advised of his reclassification to I-A and by which he was further advised of his right to appeal the change of classification, of this right to a personal appearance before the Board, and of his right to obtain information regarding his reclassification from any Selective Service Board (EX 2). However, the Local Board did not send Wills a Delinquency Notice until January 3, 1966.



Wills contends, therefore, that he was prejudiced by the delay and was denied procedural due process because he did not know the reason for his I-A classification. (The reason for the delay appears to be that the Local Board was requesting the advice of the State Director of Selective Service for the State of California as to whether or not it should order Wills for immediate induction. An affirmative reply from the State Director was received by the Local Board on December 27, 1965, at which time the Delinquency Notice was then forwarded to the registrant).

A. <u>Lateness In Sending Delinquency Notice Didn't Prejudice Appellant Because He Already Knew Reason For Reclassification</u>

32 C.F.R. 1642.4(a) provides that a Local Board may declare a registrant to be delinquent whenever he has failed to perform any duty required of him under the Selective Service law. 32 C.F.R. 1642.4(b) provides that when a registrant is declared delinquent, the Board should (1) note this fact in registrant's Classification Questionnaire, (2) prepare a Delinquency Notice, and (3) mail the original of the Delinquency Notice to the registrant. Local Board No. 47 immediately accomplished the first and second requirement, but did not fulfull the third requirement until January 3, 1966, about two months later.

The purpose of the requirement of mailing a copy of the Delinquency Notice to the registrant is to make him aware of



his delinquency and the reason therefor. Receipt of a
Delinquency Notice by the registrant would be important when
he had unknowingly failed to perform a required duty or when
a third party had furnished information to the Board alleging
that the registrant had so failed to perform his duties.
That is not the situation in this case. Wills wrote his
draft board and told them that he had "intentionally destroyed
my draft card and will henceforth refuse to carry another."
He further advised his Board in the letter "I will refuse to
co-operate with your office in any manner whatsoever." He
then challenged his Board to act against him in the following
language:

If you wish to take any measures against me, you can contact me at the following address...

Hence, it is impossible to visualize how Wills could have been misled when he received a Notice of Reclassification into Class I-A, which Notice was postmarked a week after he mailed his letter to the draft board. The facts that he had placed himself in a delinquent status by his own positive and overt action, and had invited the Board to take action against him, strongly suggest that he knew why he was reclassified I-A.

32 C.F.R. 1642.3 casts strong doubt as to whether a Local Board is even required to immediately send out Delinquency Notices. It states:



Compliance by a Local Board or any other agency of the Selective Service System with any or all of the procedures prescribed by the regulations in this part is not a condition precedent to the prosecution of any person under the provisions of Section 12 of Title 1 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended (32 C.F.R. 1642.3).

Even if immediate Notice is required, said Notice would not have given appellant any information of which he was not already aware.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

This Court has covered the topic of procedural irregularities in <a href="Minimum">Knox v. United States</a>, 200 F.2d 398 (9th Cir.1952):


Procedural irregularities which do not result in prejudice to the registrant are to be disregarded.

And in Shaw v. United States, 264 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1959) the same Court stated:

An appellate court is not required to search the record with a microscope in an effort to find minute but harmless flaws in the work of administrative bodies or the lower courts.

## B. Delinquency Notices Do Not Afford Registrants Any Procedural Rights

There is no merit in appellant's conclusion, contained on page 58 of his opening brief, that the "failure of the draft board to notify appellant of the Declaration of Delinquency in October stripped him of several procedural protections afforded him by the Selective Service Regulations..." A Declaration of Delinquency of itself does not afford a registrant the right to a personal appearance, to a



reopening, or to an appeal. 32 C.F.R. 1642.14 provides that a registrant can request a personal appearance before his Board and take an appeal only when he has been classified in or reclassified into Class I-A or I-AO under the provisions of 32 C.F.R. 1642. Hence, even if the Local Board had mailed the Delinquency Notice to Wills in October, 1965, said Notice by itself would not entitle him to a personal appearance or to an appeal.

C. Appellant Was Advised Of Right To Personal Appearance And To Appeal On October 23, 1965, But Did Not Exercise These Rights; Hence He Failed To Exhaust His Administrative Remedies

After Wills had been declared delinquent on October 21, 1965, he was reclassified into Class I-A by the Local Board on the same date. A Notice of Classification (SSS Form No. 110) was mailed to Wills on October 23, 1965, advising him of his new I-A classification. The Notice of Classification also advised him of his rights to a personal appearance and to an appeal in the following language:

If this classification is by a Local Board, you may, within ten days after the mailing of this Notice, file a written request for a personal appearance before the Local Board (unless this classification has been determined upon such personal appearance). Following such personal appearance, you may file a written notice of appeal from the Local Board's classification within the applicable period mentioned in the next paragraph after the date of the mailing of the new Notice of Classification. If you do not wish a personal appearance but do

.



want to appeal your case, you may do so by making such an appeal in writing to your Local Board, within the specified time...

If an appeal has been taken, and one or more members of the Appeal Board dissented from such classification, you may file a written notice of appeal to the President with your Local Board within ten days after the mailing of this Notice.

Hence, Wills was fully advised of all the procedural rights to which he was entitled. Furthermore, he was advised by the SSS Form No. 110 to visit any Local Board for advice or information concerning his reclassification. This was set forth in the following language contained within SSS Form No. 110: "For information and advice, go to any Local Board."

Wills failed to take any action at all. He did not visit a Local Board; he did not request a personal appearance; he did not seek an appeal. Even after receiving the Delinquency Notice on January 3, 1966, Wills took no action, even though he could have contacted his Local Board before an Induction Order issued on January 31, 1966. The issue of the Delinquency Notice was not raised until the actual trial of this case.

The law is very clear that a registrant must exhaust all of his adminitrative remedies with the Selective Service System before he can attack his classification in a Court of law. Evans v. United States, 252 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1958); Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 88L.Ed. 305 (1944)



(and numerous other cases). Having been advised of his reclassification into Class I-A on October 23, 1965, and having been further advised of his right to a personal appearance and to an appeal, Wills did nothing. Accordingly, he failed to exhaust administrative remedies and cannot complain of his classification at this time.

## CONCLUSION

Wills was properly declared a delinquent on October 21, 1965, for non-possession of his draft card. He was properly reclassified into Class I-A on October 21, 1965, because of his delinquency and was immediately advised of said reclassification and of the appeal rights attached thereto. Wills failed to seek a personal appearance or to appeal his classification, and because he failed to exhaust these administrative remedies, he is precluded from attacking his classification now. Accordingly, the Order for Induction was valid, and having refused to be inducted, Wills is guilty as charged. Therefore, the United States respectfully contends that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

EUGENE G. CUSHING
United States Attorney

MICHAEL J. SWOFFORD
Assistant United States Attorney



24

25

I certify that, in connection with the preparation of this brief, I have examined Rules 18 and 19 of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and that, in my opinion, the foregoing brief is in full compliance with these rules.

MICHAEL J. SWOFFORD

Assistant United States Attorney

I hereby certify that a copy of the aforesaid Brief of Appellee was mailed this date to

Mr. Kenneth A. MacDonald Attorney at Law 1500 Hoge Building Seattle, Washington 98104

Counsel for Appellant

DATED at Seattle, Washington, this 22 day of June, 1967.

MICHAEL J. SWOFFORD

Assistant United States Attorney

